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Abstract. Two-person zero-sum stochastic games are considered under the
long-run average expected payo¨ criterion. State and action spaces are as-
sumed ®nite. By making use of the concept of maximal communicating
classes, the following decomposition algorithm is introduced for solving two-
person zero-sum stochastic games: First, the state space is decomposed into
maximal communicating classes. Then, these classes are organized in an
hierarchical order where each level may contain more than one maximal
communicating class. Best stationary strategies for the states in a maximal
communicating class at a level are determined by using the best stationary
strategies of the states in the previous levels that are accessible from that class.
At the initial level, a restricted game is de®ned for each closed maximal com-
municating class and these restricted games are solved independently. It is
shown that the proposed decomposition algorithm is exact in the sense that
the solution obtained from the decomposition procedure gives the best sta-
tionary strategies for the original stochastic game.
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1 Introduction
In this article, two-person zero-sum stochastic games are considered. The
players periodically observe the state of the process and independently take
one of ®nitely many actions that are available at the current state. The state
space is assumed ®nite. Depending on the current state and the actions taken,
the state to be visited at the next epoch is determined and player II makes an
instantaneous payment to player I. Under the long-run average expected
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payo¨ criterion, player II aims to minimize his average payment to player I
who tries to maximize his average return. At each state, available actions of
each player and the instantaneous payo¨ amounts and the transition proba-
bilities that correspond to every action pair are all known by both of the
players.
Stochastic games are classi®ed according to their ergodic or data (e.g.,
transitions, payo¨s) structure. The following are the stochastic games with
di¨erent data structures: stochastic games with perfect information in which
one player's action space is singleton at every state, the single-controller sto-
chastic games, the switching-controller stochastic games, the separable reward
state independent transition stochastic games (SER-SIT games), the additive
reward additive transition stochastic games (AR-AT games). In this article, a
game that is not unichain and does not have a speci®c data structure is going
to be called as general stochastic game. Value of an undiscounted game is
de®ned as the amount of long-run average expected payo¨ on which the
players agree. A strategy pair that gives this payo¨ is called optimal strategy
pair, none of the players can improve his payo¨ by unilateral deviations from
this strategy pair. It is known that optimal strategies of the stochastic games
are in the class of behavior strategies [1]. Stationary strategies form a subclass
of behavior strategies. Depending on the current state of the process, sta-
tionary strategies are expressed by the probability distributions over the action
spaces. It should be noted that a general stochastic game may not have an
optimal stationary strategy pair. For such games, Filar et al. [9] de®ned best
stationary strategies with respect to a measure of distance from optimality.
Focus of this article is on developing a decomposition procedure for gen-
eral stochastic games. The aim is to compute best stationary strategies of any
stochastic game by solving a number of stochastic games with smaller action
and/or state spaces instead of solving the original game. For that purpose,
what is proposed in this article is to decompose the state space and de®ne a
restricted game over each partition of the state space. It is shown that sol-
utions of these restricted games give best stationary strategies for the original
stochastic game.
State classi®cation according to the accessibility relations was introduced
by Bather [3]. As a result of this classi®cation, Ross and Varadarajan [16]
studied the concept of strongly communicating classes in detail. In [16], con-
strained Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) are solved by using a decom-
position approach. Note that strongly communicating classes correspond to
maximal recurrent classes. Later, Baykal-GuÈrsoy [4] employed the same con-
cept for solving single-controller stochastic games. In these studies, the ap-
proach is to identify the strongly communicating classes and to decompose the
state space into strongly communicating classes and a (possibly empty) set of
transient states that are all disjoint. For each strongly communicating class, a
system (a constrained MDP or a single-controller stochastic game) restricted
to the states of that class, is de®ned. These restricted systems are solved in-
dependently. Then, an aggregate system is constructed based on the optimal
or e-optimal stationary strategies obtained from the restricted systems. Each
strongly communicating class under its optimal stationary strategies is re-
placed with an aggregate state. Aggregate states together with the transient
states form the aggregate system. Solution of this aggregate system gives op-
timal stationary strategies for the original constrained MDP or the original
single-controller stochastic game.
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The decomposition approach of [16] and [4] does not work for general
stochastic games due to contradicting objectives of the players both of whom
have control over the game. In this article, the following approach is intro-
duced to solve undiscounted stochastic games: First, the state space is de-
composed into maximal communicating classes, and then these classes are
assigned to disjoint levels so that each maximal communicating class is con-
sidered at only one of those levels. The states are placed into levels in such a
way that best stationary strategies for the states in maximal communicating
classes considered at a level are determined by the best stationary strategies of
the states considered in the previous levels. A restricted game is constructed
for each maximal communicating class over the state space of that class as
well as the states at the previous levels that are accessible from that class.
Recurrent classes that are formed under the best stationary strategies for the
restricted games of the previous levels are replaced with aggregate states while
keeping the transient states as they are. Starting from the initial level of the
hierarchy, each restricted game is solved independently. Thus, the restricted
games solved at a level give best stationary strategies for the states of that
level. In solving restricted games, the ergodic and/or data structure of the
game could be exploited and e½cient algorithms could be used (an extensive
survey of the existing algorithms is given in [13]).
This article is organized as follows: In section 2, notation is introduced.
Section 3 introduces the proposed decomposition approach. In section 4,
construction of the restricted games is explained and the proposed algorithm
is given. It is shown that the stationary strategies obtained by the decom-
position algorithm are the best stationary strategies of the original stochastic
game.
2 Preliminaries
The underlying stochastic process for a two-person zero-sum stochastic game
is fXn;An;Bn; n  1; 2; . . .g where Xn and An (Bn) are the random variables
that denote the state of the game and the action taken by player I (II), respe-
ctively, at decision epoch n. Xn takes values in a ®nite state space S 
f1; . . . ;Sg, say Xn  i. At state i, player I (II) takes an action, say a (b), from
a ®nite action space Ai  f1; . . . ;Mig Bi  f1; . . . ;Nig. The amount of in-
stantaneous payment made by player II to player I at epoch n is denoted by
the random variable Rn  RXn;An;Bn as a function of the state visited and
the actions taken at this epoch. Payo¨ amounts are ®nite. The next state of the
process is determined via the transition probabilities that are also called
the law of motion. The process is assumed time-homogeneous, i.e., the ex-
pected payo¨ ERXn  i;An  a;Bn  b is equal to riab and the transition
probability PXn1  j jXn  i;An  a;Bn  b is equal to Piabj for every n.
Stationary strategies of players I and II are denoted by the vectors a 
a11; a12; . . . ; a1M1 ; a21; . . . ; a2M2 ; . . . ; aS1; . . . ; aSMS  and b  b11; b12; . . . ; b1N1 ;
b21; . . . ; b2N2 ; . . . ; bS1; . . . ; bSNS , respectively. Note that aia (bib) is the condi-
tional probability PAn  a jXn  i (PBn  b jXn  i). The stationary
strategy pair taken by the players in state i, i.e., ai1; . . . ; aiMi; bi; . . . ; biNi,
is denoted as ai; bi for every i A S. If stationary strategies a and b are as-
signed to the players, the expected payo¨s and the transition probabilities
under these strategies are represented by ria; b and Pija; b, respectively.
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When the initial state of the process is i, the long-run average expected payo¨
is denoted by fia; b as a function of the stationary strategy pair a; b taken
by the players and it is de®ned as follows:






Ea;bRn jX1  i;
where Ea;b represents the expectation under stationary strategy pair a; b.
If there exists a stationary strategy pair a; b  that satis®es the saddle
point condition, i.e., fia; b U fia; b U fia; b for every i A S and all
stationary strategies a and b, then a; b  is called optimal. As the optimality
condition implies, unilateral deviations of player I (II) from a (b ) results in
less reward (more loss) for him. The corresponding payo¨ fia; b  is called
the value of the game for initial state i. As an immediate implication of the
saddle point condition, e-optimality is de®ned as follows: A stationary strat-
egy pair ~a; ~b is said to be e-optimal if fia; ~b ÿ eU fi~a; ~bU fi~a; b  e
holds true for every i A S and all stationary strategies a and b.
Best stationary strategies are de®ned via the use of a distance function in-
troduced by Filar et. al [9]. This distance function d can be evaluated for
any stationary strategy pair ~a; ~b by making use of the following formula:
d~a; ~b Pi ASmaxafia; ~b ÿminbfi~a; b. Clearly, d is always nonneg-
ative since each summation term is nonnegative. ~a; ~b is said to be e-optimal
if d~a; ~b is less than or equal to e. Hence, ~a; ~b is optimal if d vanishes at this
point.




where rows (columns) correspond to the actions available for player I (II). j is
the state to be visited at the next epoch given that the current state is i and
players I and II take actions a and b, respectively. If the next state is de-
termined according to a probability distribution over the state space, then this
distribution is written in the lower right corner.
3 Decomposition in stochastic games
This section starts with the de®nitions of maximal and strongly communicat-
ing classes in stochastic games and an adaptation of a procedure in [16] to
identify strongly communicating classes.
A communicating class is called maximal communicating class if it is the
largest obtainable under every possible stationary strategy pair. The maximal
communicating classes could be open, i.e., a maximal communicating class
may have transitions to states out of the class, or closed. Clearly, maximal
communicating classes that are closed are maximal recurrent classes. If a state
visited by the process is left in one transition with probability 1 under every
stationary strategy pair, it de®nes a maximal communicating class by itself.
Let D1, D2; . . ., DW be the maximal communicating classes. The collection of
maximal communicating classes fD1; . . . ;DWg de®nes a (unique) partition of
the state space.
De®nition 1. A set of states CJS is called a strongly communicating class if
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(i) C is recurrent under some stationary strategy pair, (ii) C is not a proper
subset of another set that satis®es (i).
Obviously, strongly communicating classes are maximal recurrent classes.
Note that maximal recurrent classes may not be recurrent under every sta-
tionary strategy pair. Let C1; . . . ;CK denote the strongly communicating
classes. The states that are not in strongly communicating classes are transient
under every stationary strategy pair. Let H be the set of these transient states.
By de®nition, H  Sÿ 6K
k1Ck. The following lemma is analogous to an
observation for MDPs due to Ross and Varadarajan [16].
Lemma 1. The collection of strongly communicating classes and the set of
transient states fC1; . . . ;CK ;Hg forms a (unique) partition of the state space
S.
Proof: The collection fC1; . . . ;CK ;Hg covers S, and the set of strongly
communicating classes and H are disjoint by de®nition. So, it has to be
shown that the strongly communicating classes are disjoint. Suppose there
exist two strongly communicating classes, C1 and C2, that are not disjoint.
Using some stationary strategy pairs a1; b1 and a2; b2 under which
C1 and C2 are recurrent, respectively, let
~aia 
aia1 i A C1 ÿ C2; a A Ai;
aia2 i A C2 ÿ C1; a A Ai,
laia1  1ÿ laia2 i A C1 XC2; a A Ai,
8>><>:
where 0 < l < 1. De®ne ~b similarly. Now, consider the state set C  C1 WC2.
Since the states in C are accessible from each other in P~a; ~b, C is said to be
communicating under ~a; ~b. Also, both C1 and C2 are recurrent under
a1; b1 and a2; b2, respectively, which leads toPj A SÿC Pij~a; ~b 
0, i A C. Then, C is recurrent under ~a; ~b. Thus, C1 and C2 are proper subsets
of C that satis®es i in de®nition 1. This contradicts the assumption that C1
and C2 are strongly communicating classes. r
In [16], Ross and Varadarajan outlined a procedure to decompose state
space of an MDP into strongly communicating classes and transient states.
Here, this procedure is revised for stochastic games. The original stochastic
game is considered at the ®rst step. The maximal communicating classes of the
state space are identi®ed. If a maximal communicating class is closed, then
this set is labeled as a strongly communicating class. Since the state space is
assumed ®nite, there exists at least one closed communicating class. If there
are open communicating classes, these classes are considered one by one.
Suppose D is such a class. If there exists an action pair a; b that takes the
process out of class D from a state of class D, say state i, i.e.,
P
j A SÿD Piabj
> 0, then the corresponding entry in the matrix of state i is deleted. Note that
not necessarily the actions a and b but the transitions expressed by distribution
Piab1; . . . ;PiabS are deleted. If state i is left with an empty action space, then
it is labeled as a transient state. This procedure is repeated for every state in D
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until a set D 0JD is obtained with the following properties: (i) there is at least
one action pair for every state of D 0; (ii) none of the states in SÿD 0 is
reachable from D 0 under the remaining action pairs. Note that D 0 is obtained
when the transitions speci®ed above are deleted. At the second step, the same
procedure is employed for D 0 with the remaining transitions of the states in
D 0, i.e., each closed maximal communicating class is labeled as a strongly
communicating class and each open maximal communicating class is exam-
ined separately. This is repeated until every state in S is either labeled as a
transient state or considered in a strongly communicating class. The set of
transient states is further decomposed into maximal communicating classes.
In the example problem given below, maximal and strongly communicat-
ing classes are identi®ed.
Example 1

























































The maximal communicating classes are D1  f1; 2g, D2  f3g, D3  f4g,
D4  f5; 6g, D5  f7g, D6  f8g, D7  f9g. D1 and D2 are closed whereas
D3, D4, D6 and D7 are open. The strongly communicating classes are
C1  f1; 2g, C2  f3g, C3  f5; 6g, C4  f8g, C5  f9g and the set of tran-
sient states is H  f4; 7g. Note that in this example every strongly commu-
nicating class is also a maximal communicating class. r
b) Consider the stochastic game for which the matrices of states 6, 7 and 8
are given as





























and the matrices for the remaining states stay the same as in part (a). Then,
the maximal communicating classes are D  f1; 2g, D2  f3g, D3  f4g,
D4  f5; 6g, D5  f7; 8g, D6  f9g. D1 and D2 are closed unlike D3, D4, D5,
D6. The strongly communicating classes are C1  f1; 2g, C2  f3g, C3  f5g,
C4  f9g and the set of transient states is H  f4; 6; 7; 8g. r
Next, an example is given to demonstrate why the solution approach pro-
posed in [4] for single-controller stochastic games does not work for stochastic
games in general. This is a special case of a stochastic game with switching
controllers, where at every state i either Piabj  Piaj, meaning only player I
































Open and closed strongly communicating classes are f1; 2; 3g and f4g, f5g,
respectively. The value of the game that is restricted to the state space f4g
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The value of this restricted game is 10 (8) for initial state 3 (1 or 2), and the
optimal stationary strategies are a  1; 0; 1; 0; 1 and b   1; 0; 1; 1. In [4],
each strongly communicating class is replaced with an aggregate state because
the value of a restricted game de®ned over a strongly communicating class is
independent of the initial state. In this example problem, the value of the re-
stricted game de®ned over the state space f1; 2; 3g depends on the initial state.
Hence, the decomposition procedure in [4] can not be applied directly but one
might think of employing the idea by replacing each subset of f1; 2; 3g that is
recurrent under the optimal stationary strategies of the restricted game with
an aggregate state, and then constructing an aggregate game considering the
transitions that take the process out of the aggregate states. For this example
problem, f1; 2g and f3g are recurrent under the optimal stationary strategies
of the restricted game; so, each can be replaced with an aggregate state by
de®ning absorbing action pairs with the corresponding payo¨ amounts 8 and
10, respectively. Then, the next step would be to construct the aggregate game
with the use of transitions 1; 2 and 1; 3 of state 1 and 3; 1 of state 2 ((1,1)
and (3,1) of state 3) which can take the process out of the aggregate state
f1; 2g (f3g). One problem related with this approach is to construct such an
aggregate game; this is not an easy task as in the case of constrained MDPs
and the single-controller stochastic games as observed with the use of this ex-
ample. Even if this di½culty can be handled, the solution of the aggregate
game would not give the best stationary strategies for the original game be-
cause the value of the original game is 16 (15) for initial state 2 (1 or 3), i.e.,
the original game value of state 1 is di¨erent from the value of state 2 al-
though these two states are considered to de®ne an aggregate state in the ag-
gregate game.
One other extension of the idea in [4] might be to ®x optimal stationary
strategies of the restricted games. As another example, consider the case where
r221  3. Then, the value of the restricted game de®ned over f1; 2; 3g is 10 (7)
for initial state 3 (1 or 2) and a; b   1; 1; 0; 0; 1; 1; 0; 1; 1. Consider the




























The solution of this game gives a value of 15 (16) for the initial state 3 (1 or 2).
When the process is initially in 4 (5), the game value stays as 16 (15) because
f4g (f5g) is a closed class. However, the value of the original stochastic game
is 16 (15) for the initial state 2 (1 or 3) under optimal stationary strategies
a  1; 0; 0; 1; 0; 0; 1; 1; 1 and b   0; 1; 0; 1; 1; 1; 1. Thus, this approach
does not give the correct result when the initial state is 1. r
Note that, unlike constrained MDPs and single-controller stochastic games
studied in [15], [16] and [4], respectively, under the best stationary strategy
pair a strongly communicating class (even a closed communicating stochastic
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game) may have a multichain structure with more than one recurrent class
having di¨erent average payo¨ amounts and (maybe) some transient states.
An example of this case for a (closed) communicating stochastic game is given
in [2].
From the analysis of example 2, it is observed that the solution of each
game restricted to a strongly communicating class (even to a maximal com-
municating class) may not lead to the best stationary strategies for the initial
states in that class. This is because both of the players have control over the
game unlike single-controller stochastic games. In this article, a new solution
procedure is introduced to solve general stochastic games. First, the state
space is decomposed into maximal communicating classes. Further, these
maximal communicating classes are decomposed into hierarchically ordered
disjoint levels. The levels of the classes are determined according to the fol-
lowing de®nition:
De®nition 2. If a maximal communicating class is closed, then its level is 0. If a
maximal communicating class is open, its level n is the maximum number of
transitions it takes to reach a level 0 class without counting more than one visit
to a maximal communicating class.
Let Ln denote the set of states in the maximal communicating classes at level
n. The levels in example 1(a) are L0  D1 WD2, L1  D3 WD4, L2 
D5 WD6, L3  D7. In example 1(b), the levels are L0  D1 WD2, L1 
D3 WD4, L2  D5, L3  D6. Note that Ln is a disjoint set, i.e., there does not
exist any action pair under which a maximal communicating class is accessible
from another class at the same level. This property allows one to solve an in-
dependent game restricted to a maximal communicating class at a level and all
other states at the previous levels that are accessible from this class.
Next, a procedure is given to identify the levels of a stochastic game.
Step 1) Let L0 be the union of closed maximal communicating classes, and let
n  0. If L0  S, stop. Otherwise, go to step 2.






Piabj > 0 for some i in D and a; b A Ai Bi. Let G be the set
of states in such classes.
Step 3) For a maximal communicating class DJG, if
P
j A GÿD Piabj  0 for
every i A D, a; b A Ai Bi, then put D in Ln1.
Step 4) If 6n1
d0Ld
 
 S, stop. Otherwise, increment n by 1 and go to step 2.
4 The proposed procedure
The algorithm proposed in this study can be outlined as follows: At level 0,
the stochastic games restricted to the closed maximal communicating classes
are solved independently to obtain the best stationary strategies of the states
in these classes. Based on their ergodic structure under the best stationary
strategies, recurrent classes formed are replaced with absorbing aggregate
states. At the next level, for each class in L1 a restricted game is constructed
by ®xing the best stationary strategies of the states in L0. The state space of
the restricted game is composed of the states in that class together with the
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aggregate and transient states of level 0 that are accessible from these states.
Solutions of these restricted games give the best stationary strategies for the
states in L1. Then, using these solutions the algorithm proceeds to the next
level until every class in S is taken into consideration.
Under any stationary strategy pair, each recurrent class is in one of the
strongly communicating classes (the arguments that lead to this result are
presented in [16]) which are subsets of the maximal communicating classes.
But all of the states in a maximal communicating class may be transient under
every stationary strategy pair. Considering these and the communication
property satis®ed by the maximal communicating classes, in the proposed de-
composition algorithm each maximal communicating class is considered at
one of the disjoint levels. Then, every recurrent class obtained under the best
stationary strategies of a level can be replaced with an absorbing aggregate
state in the restricted games of the next levels.
In this study, there is no condition imposed on the ergodic properties and/
or the data (i.e., transitions and/or payo¨s) of the stochastic games. When the
original or a restricted game falls into a class of stochastic games with speci®c
ergodic and/or data structure, an algorithm that exploits the special structure
may be used in the implementation of the decomposition procedure. Various
algorithms are available in the literature for irreducible stochastic games
(Ho¨man and Karp [10]), unichain stochastic games (Federgruen [5], Van der
Wal [17]), stochastic games with a value independent of the initial state
(Federgruen [5]), communicating stochastic games with a value independent
of the initial state (Avs:ar and Baykal-GuÈrsoy [2]), stochastic games with per-
fect information and single-controller (Filar [6], Vrieze [18], Hordijk and
Kallenberg [11], Baykal-GuÈrsoy [4]), switching-controller stochastic games
(Filar and Raghavan [7], Vrieze et. al [19]), SER-SIT games (Parthasarathy
et. al. [12]), AR-AT games (Raghavan and Tijs and Vrieze [14]). If a given
stochastic game does not fall into any of these classes, then the NLP for-
mulation due to Filar et. al. [9] can be used. In such a case, the proposed de-
composition algorithm would make the use of this NLP easier, especially for
the stochastic games with large state and/or action spaces. Since the NLP
formulation works for every stochastic game regardless of its ergodic and data
structure, the proposed approach will be explained via the use of this NLP
formulation.
NLP formulation in [9] is based on a characterization of the stationary
equilibrium due to Filar and Schultz [8] and it ®nds the best stationary strat-
egies even when the optimal stationary strategies fail to exist. This for-
mulation is given below. It supplies the best stationary strategy pair with









Piajbgj; i A S; a A Ai;
gi  vi V riab 
X
j AS
Piajbvj; i A S; a A Ai;




Pibjauj; i A S; b A Bi;
ui  ti U riba 
X
j AS
Pibjatj; i A S; b A Bi;
X
a AAi
aia  1; i A S;
aia V 0; i A S; a A Ai;X
b ABi
bib  1; i A S;
bib V 0; i A S; b A Bi;
gi; ui; vi; ti unrestricted; i A S;
where the decision variables giui and viti are the long-run average expected
payo¨ and the change in the total payo¨, respectively, when the second (®rst)
player employs stationary strategy ba and the initial state is i; i A S. Note
that the objective function gives the value of the distance function d at a; b.
If the optimal objective function value is zero, then the stochastic game has
optimal stationary strategies. On the other hand, for an e-optimal stationary
strategy pair an upper bound on the objective function value is 2Se. Another
observation that results from Problem 1 is that if the minimum of the objective
function does not exist, then for every e > 0 there exists a stationary strategy
pair that is e inf Pi ASgi ÿ ui-optimal.
Remark: Problem 1 is separable. Minimization of
P
i AS gi over the con-
straints in terms of g; v; b and maximization of
P
i AS ui over the constraints in
terms of u; t; a are two bilinear problems that are independent of each other.
The former subproblem maximizes payo¨ over a strategies for a given b and
minimizes this amount over all b strategies. So, it solves minb maxafia; b,
i A S, for the best b strategy. Similarly, the latter subproblem solves
maxa minbfia; b, i A S, for the best a strategy. For the former subproblem,
let b  be the solution and â be the maximizing strategy of the ®rst player
given b  as the second player's strategy. Then, â; b  satis®es minb maxa
fia; b  fiâ; b , i A S. Similarly, let a; b̂  be the solution for the latter
subproblem. Since the existence of optimal stationary strategies is not pre-
sumed in this article, this property, i.e., characterization of the best stationary
strategies by two independent programs, shows the requirement to use the
decomposition procedure two times. One pass is needed to compute g and b
vectors and the other pass is to ®nd u and a vectors. In the former (latter)
pass, the restricted games are solved for minb maxafia; b maxa minbfia; b
values at every level.
If the process is initially at level n, Problem 1 is reduced to the following
formulation in order to ®nd the best stationary strategies corresponding to the
states in Ln:









j A 6 d
w0 Lw 
Piajbgj; i A Ld ; a A Ai; d  0; . . . ; n;
gi  vi V riab 
X
j A 6 d
w0 Lw 





Pibjauj; i A Ld ; b A Bi; d  0; . . . ; n;
ui  ti U riba 
X
j A 6dw0 Lw 
Pibjatj; i A Ld ; b A Bi; d  0; . . . ; n;
X
a AAi
aia  1; i A 6nd0 Ld
ÿ 
;




; a A Ai;X
b ABi
bib  1; i A 6nd0 Ld
ÿ 
;




; b A Bi;





Without making use of the aggregation concept, for each level such reductions
in Problem 1 show why the proposed decomposition procedure gives the best
stationary strategies of a stochastic game. This observation is stated in prop-
osition 1.











Piabj  1; a; b A Ai Bi;
which means that for computing best stationary strategies of the states at level









Note that each maximal communicating class is kept as a partition in the
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decomposed state space because under every stationary strategy pair the re-
current classes are subsets of the maximal communicating classes. Then, since
Ln is a disjoint set, each maximal communicating class in Ln and the states
that are accessible from it can be considered in an independent problem with
all the variables and the constraints in Problem 2n corresponding to these
states. This observation leads to the introduction of a restricted game for each
maximal communicating class in Ln with all the states that can be reached
from this class. In the following subsection, the construction of a restricted
game at a level is explained. This construction is based on the ergodic struc-
ture of the game that is determined by the best stationary strategies of the
states at the previous levels. Next, the proposed algorithm is presented and it
is shown that this algorithm ®nds the best stationary strategies of the sto-
chastic games.
4.1 The restricted games
For every closed (absorbing) maximal communicating class Dm at level 0, a
restricted game is de®ned over state space Dm with action spaces Ai and Bi
for i A Dm. Let am; b m be the best stationary strategy pair and âmb̂ m be the
strategy maximizing (minimizing) fia; b, i A S, given b mam for the second
(®rst) player. Strategy pairs âm; b m and am; b̂ m give gi and ui values, re-
spectively, for every i A Dm.
In order to construct restricted games of level 1, consider the ergodic
structure under âm; b m for every Dm such that Dm JL0. Identify each re-
current class, say Rz, in Dm and let Zm be the set of recurrent classes in Dm
under âm; b m for every Dm JL0. Since gi is the same for every i A Rz, it will
be denoted by gzm. Replace every recurrent class Rz with an absorbing ag-
gregate state z. De®ne Tm as the set of transient states in Dm under âm; b m
for Dm JL0, i.e., Tm  Dm ÿ 6z AZmRz
 
. The transient states in Tm are
kept as they are. With the use of these aggregate and transient states, the re-
stricted games to be solved at level 1 are de®ned as follows: For each maximal
communicating class DJL1, a restricted game is constructed. The state space
of the corresponding restricted game, to be denoted by S, is the union of D,
and the states accessible from D. The latter would be some aggregate states in
Zm and/or some transient states in Tm such that Dm JL0. For each ag-
gregate state z, abstract actions yz1 and yz2 are de®ned for the ®rst and the
second players, respectively. Then, action spaces of aggregate state z are
Az  fyz1g and Bz  fyz2g. The corresponding payo¨ rzyz1yz2 is equal to gzm
for z A Zm. For every state h in D, the action spaces and the payo¨ amounts
are kept the same as in the original stochastic game, i.e., Ah Ah, Bh  Bh
and rhab  rhab. For each transient state x in Tm, which is included in S; âmx
and b mx are ®xed. The law of motion is given by transition matrix P. For
z A Zm such that Dm JL0, since action pair yz1; yz2 is absorbing,
Pzyz1yz2 z  1. For a state x in Tm such that Dm JL0, the value of rx is equal to




Pxjâm; b m if l A Zm,
Pxlâm; b m if l A Tm.
8<:
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Phabj if l A Zm such that Dm JL0,
Phabl if l A Tm such that Dm JL0,
Phabl if l A D:
8>><>>:
Solutions of the restricted games constructed at level 1 give the best sta-
tionary strategies for the states in L1. Note that best stationary strategies of
the states in L0 are obtained by the restricted games of level 0 and these
strategies are kept ®xed in the restricted games of level 1. In order to construct
restricted games of level 2, every recurrent class Rz and every transient state x
in L1 are identi®ed under the best stationary strategy pair of the restricted
games of level 1. Each recurrent class is replaced with an aggregate state z and
transient states are kept as they are. For each aggregate state z, abstract ab-
sorbing action yz1; yz2 are de®ned and for each transient state the best sta-
tionary strategies found at level 1 are ®xed. The procedure proceeds this way
with the construction and solution of a restricted game for each maximal
communicating class at every level.
Based on the best stationary strategies found for the restricted games at





, a procedure to construct the restricted games of level n 1
is given below.
. Identify the set of recurrent classes, Zm, and the set of transient states, Tm,
under âm; b m for every maximal communicating class Dm JLn.. Replace each recurrent class Rz; z A Zm, such that Dm JLn, with an ag-
gregate state z and de®ne abstract absorbing actions yz1; yz2. Keep each
transient state x A Tm, Dm JLn, as it is and ®x its strategy pair as âmx ; b mx .. De®ne transition matrices and payo¨ values as follows:
± For z A Zm such that Dm JLn, rzyz1yz2  gmz and Pzyz1yz2 z  1.




Pxjâm; b m if l A Zm





Pxlâm; b m if l A Tm











the same as in the restricted games of level n.
± In a restricted game de®ned for a maximal communicating class DJLn1,














Phabl if l A D.
8>><>:
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Note that this procedure is employed for each restricted game at every
level to obtain gi and âi ; b i  for all i A S. A similar one has to be employed
to obtain ui values and ai ; b̂ i . An explanation is not given for the latter
problem, because the idea is the same as in the former one.
4.2 The decomposition algorithm
Based on the development in the previous section, the proposed decom-
position algorithm is presented below.
Decomposition Algorithm
Step 1) Identify maximal communicating classes D1; . . . ;DW.
Step 2) Identify levels of the maximal communicating classes. Let n  0.
Step 3) Construct restricted games of level n and solve them for âm; b m and
am; b̂ m for each maximal communicating class Dm JLn. Let ai ; b i  ami ; b mi  for every i A Dm, Dm JLn.
Step 4) If 6n
d0 Ld S
ÿ
, stop. Otherwise, increment n by 1 and go to step 3.
A formal proof is given below to show that the decomposition algorithm
works although it is immediately observed that this result is the consequence
of proposition 1 and the independence of the restricted games from each other
at every level.
Proposition 2. Proposed decomposition algorithm gives the best stationary
strategies for the undiscounted two-person zero-sum stochastic games.
Proof: The proof is by induction for subproblem minb maxafia; b, i A S.
The same arguments can also be used to give a proof for subproblem
maxa minbfia; b; i A S.
If the initial states are restricted to level 0, then Problem 1 becomes equiv-
alent to Problem 20. This reduction in Problem 1 results from the de®nition of
L0, i.e., none of the states in Sÿ L0 is accessible from the states in L0. By
de®nition of closed maximal communicating classes, the collection of the (in-
dependent) restricted games constructed at level 0 is equivalent to Problem 20.
These restricted games are solved in the third step of the algorithm. From
proposition 1, minimax part of Problem 20 gives stationary strategies âi ; b i 
for every i A L0, i.e., the algorithm works for n  0.




, and the corresponding gj values are obtained by solving the
restricted games constructed at levels d  1; . . . ; n. Then, it has to be shown
that the collection of the formulations for the restricted games constructed at
level n 1 is equivalent to the minimax part of Problem 2n1 where bj and
the corresponding maximizing a strategy are ®xed as b j and â

j , respectively,




Consider the long-run average expected payo¨ for an initial state, say i, in
Ln1 under stationary strategies aj; bj for every j A Ln1 and âj ; b j  for ev-










z ij rj if i A Tm such that Dm JLn1,P
j ARz
pzj rj if i A Rz; z A Zm such that Dm JLn1,
8>><>>:
where pz is the stationary probability vector given that the process is initially
in recurrent class z, and Zm Tm) is de®ned as before to denote the set of re-
current classes (transient states) in Dm under the considered strategies, z
i
j is the
stationary probability of being in state j given that the initial state is i and rj is
the instantaneous payo¨ that depends on the strategies taken.
Let Y be the set of transient states in 6n1
d0Ld
 
under the speci®ed sta-
tionary strategies. Note that Y 6n1
d06y CDy JLdTy. Denote the transition
probability matrix from states in Y to states in Y by PYY. Let PYz be the
transition probability matrix from states in Y to states in Rz. If the process
is initially in Y, the ®rst passage probabilities to Rz are given by
I ÿ PYYÿ1PYz. Let this matrix be called as F z. Also, let I ÿ PYYÿ1 be
denoted by Q. Then, z i is expressed in terms of p z as follows: When i A Rz,
z A Zm such that Dm JLn1, the stationary probability z ij is equal to p
z
j for
j A Rz, and zero otherwise. When i A Tm such that Dm JLn1, the stationary













F zih is the ®rst passage probability to recurrent

























jz ; for i A Y;
where P
Y
jz is the transition probability from transient state j to the aggregate
state z. The relation above shows that
P
h ARz
F zih is equal to the ®rst passage
probability from i A Y to aggregate state z, say F
z
i , in the corresponding
restricted game. By making use of this observation, fi can be rewritten as
follows:
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where z
i
z is the stationary probability of being in aggregate state z given that
the initial state is i in the restricted game of class Dm JLn1. The second
equality follows by rj  rjâ; b  and gzm 
P
j ARz









Thus, fi's for i A Ln1, are also equal to the long-run average expected
payo¨ amounts obtained from the collection of the restricted games where the
recurrent classes under âj ; b j , j A 6nd0Ld
ÿ 
, are replaced with aggregate
states and aj; bj is kept as it is for every j A Ln1. This proves that the col-
lection of restricted games constructed at level n 1 gives âi ; b i  for every
i A Ln1. r
5 Conclusion
A decomposition procedure is proposed for undiscounted two-person zero-
sum stochastic games based on the consideration of each maximal communi-
cating class at only one of the disjoint levels of the state space. At the initial
level, games restricted to absorbing maximal communicating classes are
solved independently. Best stationary strategies of the states at each level
nV 1 are determined by the best stationary strategies of the states at previous
levels. Depending on the ergodic and/or data structure of the restricted games
constructed at each level, one of the available algorithms may be used. In
general, the use of NLP formulation due to Filar et al. [9] is suggested.
An extension of this decomposition approach can be used to solve undis-
counted two-person nonzero-sum stochastic games. If the NLP formulation
given in [9] is considered for the solution of restricted two-person nonzero-sum
games, it is observed that the decomposition procedure should be used only
for one pass to ®nd stationary equilibrium strategies since this NLP for-
mulation is not separable unlike Problem 1.
The motivation to devise a decomposition algorithm is to solve a stochas-
tic game by dividing it into a number of smaller stochastic games. Especially,
for the games with large state and/or action spaces the decomposition algo-
rithm would make the solution procedure easier and faster as long as decom-
position of the state space is not cumbersome. Also, when decomposition is
used it is expected that the chance of ®nding better local optimal solutions is
higher. In this study, problem in example 1(a) was solved using nonlinear
programming solver MINOS. Considering the importance of initial points for
nonlinear programming algorithms, both the NLP formulation for the origi-
nal game and the decomposition procedure were employed with various initial
solutions. When the initial point is not speci®ed, MINOS assigns zero initially
to each decision variable. Although this point was feasible for only one of the
subproblems, the use of NLP for the whole problem gave the best solution. It
also worked when the initial point was feasible. However, for speci®ed in-
feasible initial points the value of the distance function obtained from the
solution of NLP was too far from the best distance value. On the other hand,
the decomposition procedure gave the best stationary strategies for each of
those feasible and infeasible initial points. At this point, it should be noted
that as the problem size gets larger, ®nding a feasible initial solution needs
more e¨ort. One other point to be noted is that there are iterative algorithms
and LP formulations in the literature to solve games with certain properties.
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Hence, instead of using NLP formulation for the original problem, these al-
gorithms may be employed for the restricted games that have special struc-
ture, thus, further increasing the e½ciency of the decomposition algorithm.
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